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INTRODUCTION

In an April, 1995, decision, the Florida Supreme Court effectively
made it more expensive for a contractor to do condominium construction
in Florida. In Leisure Resorts, Inc. v. Frank J. Rooney, Inc.,' the court
extended the implied contractor's warranty by applying it to manufactured items. This was accomplished by defining "materials" broadly to
include such manufactured items.2
The basic facts of Leisure Resorts include a developer which
decided to have a large condominium built on a piece of land it owned.
The developer had its architect and engineer draw up the plans and then
hired a building contractor. The placement of the air-conditioning condensers in the plans presented a potential problem because each apartment's air-conditioning condenser was to be placed directly above the
condenser in the apartment below. This "stacked condenser" design
1. 654 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1995). For further factual background of this case see also Frank J.
Rooney, Inc. v. Leisure Resorts, Inc., 624 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Petitioner's Initial
Brief on the Merits, Leisure Resorts, Inc. v. Frank J. Rooney, Inc., 654 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1995)
(No. 82578); Respondent's Answer Brief on the Merits, Leisure Resorts, Inc. v. Frank J. Rooney,
Inc., 654 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1995) (No. 82578); and the Amicus Curiae Brief of the Associated
General Contractors of America, Leisure Resorts, Inc. v. Frank J. Rooney, Inc., 654 So. 2d 911
(Fla. 1995) (No. 82578).
2. See Leisure Resorts, 654 So. 2d at 912.
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made it difficult for the contractor to find an air-conditioning manufacturer which would guarantee the units because the manufacturer originally specified by the developer refused to do so. Finally, a
manufacturer was found, and the developer authorized a change order
for the new air-conditioning units. When the residents moved into this
new condominium, they found many problems including air-conditioning units that did not adequately cool their homes. The residents sued
the developer who settled with them. The developer then sought indemnification from the contractor. A jury found for the developer. The
appellate court reversed, and the Florida Supreme Court answered a certified question by extending a contractor's implied statutory warranty to
include manufactured items.
This simplified version of the facts lays out the foundation of the
case. By inserting names and additional details, it is possible to get a
clearer picture of the situation.
In the simplified version above, Leisure Resorts, Inc. is the developer, Frank J. Rooney, Inc. is the contractor, and the condominium is
The Waterview Towers located in West Palm Beach, Florida. The main
problem with the "stacked condenser" design is that the heated discharged air from one condenser rises up to the condensing unit located
directly above and causes the upper unit to overload and automatically
shut off.' The, unit owners, unhappy with many things including the
failure of the air-conditioning units to provide adequate cooling, sued
Leisure Resorts who then sought contribution or indemnity from Rooney
for any amounts attributable to construction defects. 4 At trial, 5 the jury
was instructed that the issue for determination was "whether the air conditioning equipment for the individual condominiums was fit ...for the
specific purpose for which it was supplied."6 Under this instruction, the
jury returned a verdict against Rooney. 7 The Florida Fourth District
Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred in denying Rooney's
motion for a directed verdict because, as a matter of law, Florida Statute
section 718.203(2) did not impose a warranty on the contractor that
manufactured air-conditioning units be fit for the specific purpose
3. Id.; see also Respondent's Answer Brief on the Merits at 5, Leisure Resorts (No. 82578).

4. The original action by the unit owners against Leisure Resorts was based on fraud,
negligent design, breach of fiduciary duty and construction defects. See Frank J. Rooney, 624 So.
2d at 774; Respondent's Answer Brief on the Merits at 7, Leisure Resorts (No. 82578).
5. Leisure Resorts' third-party complaint seeking indemnification from Rooney was
successfully severed from the original unit owners' action. The unit owners' suit against the
developer was settled prior to trial and thus, only the third-party complaint actually went to trial.
See Frank J.Rooney, 624 So. 2d at 774-75; Respondent's Answer Brief on the Merits at 8,
Leisure Resorts (No. 82578).
6. Respondent's Answer Brief on the Merits at 9, Leisure Resorts (No. 82578).
7. See Frank J. Rooney, 624 So. 2d at 775.
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intended.8 The Fourth District then certified the following question to
the Florida Supreme Court:
WHETHER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 718.203(2),
FLORIDA STATUTES (SUPP. 1992), 9 IMPOSE ON A CONTRACTOR AN IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR THE
INTENDED USE AND PURPOSE,WHERE THE CONTRACTOR
WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF THE CONTRACT DOCUMENTS SUGGESTS AND SUPPLIES A MANUFACTURED
ITEM SUCH AS INDIVIDUAL AIR CONDITIONING UNITS TO
A DEVELOPER FOR USE IN A BUILDING PROJECT, WHERE
SUCH ITEMS LATER PROVE NOT TO BE FIT FOR THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE FOR WHICH THEY WERE SUPPLIED?10
The Florida Supreme Court answered the certified question by holding
that a contractor's statutory warranty of fitness does apply to manufactured items such as air-conditioning units supplied by the contractor for
use in a building project, but that the contractor does not warrant those
items for a "specific purpose" under the provisions of section
718.203(2)."
The appellate court certified the question because it involves "great
public importance and is likely to have a great effect on the proper
administration of justice throughout the state."' 2 This Note will examine
the importance of the decision and explore what the decision means to
both contractors and developers.
II.

FLORIDA STATUTE SECTION

A.

718.203

History of the Statute

Courts have traditionally applied the doctrine of caveat emptor to
purchasers of real property.' 3 This "Let The Buyer Beware" approach
summarizes the rule that the buyer must examine, test and judge the
property for herself rather than depending on the seller or a third party to
8. See id.
9. The court uses the 1992 version of section 718.203 which contains the same language as

the 1979 statute originally interpreted by the trial court. See Leisure Resorts, Inc. v. Frank J.
Rooney, Inc., 654 So. 2d 911, 913 n.2 (Fla. 1995). The 1995 version is also identical and will be
referred to throughout this Note.
10. Frank J. Rooney, 624 So. 2d at 779.
11. See Leisure Resorts, 654 So. 2d at 912.

12. Frank J. Rooney, 624 So. 2d at 778-79.
13. See Mark Somerstein, The Application of Florida'sStatutory Warranty to Commercial
Condominiums, 56 FLA. B.J. 579, 579 (1982); David St. John & Rodney L. Tennyson, Legal
Considerations: Construction Defects in Condominium Conversions-the Legal Issues, 55 FLA.

B. J. 127, 127 (1981). But see Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 415 P.2d 698, 710 (Idaho 1966) (holding
that the traditional rule of caveat emptor should not be applied to an inexperienced home buyer);
Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 154 N.W.2d 803, 809 (S.D. 1967) (holding that caveat

emptor does not apply where the vendor is also the builder and the house is new).
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protect her in the event of a defect.14 Caveat emptor can produce harsh
results for a careless or unknowledgeable buyer since it places the risk of
defect entirely upon the buyer.
Courts began applying quality requirements to consumer goods
long before any move was made to do the same for real property
purchases. 5 The Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC" or "Code") contains several implied warranties that provide protection to the buyer. 6
Article 2 of the UCC applies to "transactions in goods"17 and therefore
does not apply to services. Yet, the warranties found in Article 2 can be
seen as the forerunners of implied warranties which later began to be
applied to service contracts such as those between a condominium
developer and an individual unit buyer as well as between a contractor
and the unit owners or developer.
Section 2-315 of the UCC contains an implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose.' 8 This section states three conditions that must
be met in order for such a warranty to be implied at law." First, the
seller has reason to know of the particular purpose for which the buyer
needs the goods. Second, the seller or manufacturer has reason to know
that the buyer is relying on the seller or manufacturer's skill, expertise,
or knowledge to furnish the buyer with suitable goods. Finally, the
buyer must, in fact, rely on the seller or manufacturer.
The UCC also provides for an implied warranty of merchantabilty
in section 2-314.20 This section of the Code, however, does not clearly
define "merchantability." Section 2-314(2) lists six different minimal
criteria which goods must meet to be merchantable. 2' Official Comment
6 to 2-314, however, suggests that the meaning of merchantabilty is not
14. See BLACK'S LAW DIcrONARY 222 (6th ed. 1990).

15. See Somerstein, supra note 13, at579.
16. See U.C.C. §§ 2-314 to 2-315 (1994) (implied warranty of merchantability and implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose). The corresponding sections inFlorida can be found
inFLA. STAT. §§ 672.314-.315 (1995).
17. U.C.C. § 2-102 (1994).
18. The corresponding Florida statutory section isFLA. STAT. § 672.315 (1995).

19. See U.C.C. § 2-315 (1994); see generally Vincent M. Gonzales, Note, The Buyer's
Specifications Exception to the Implied Warranty of Fimessfor a ParticularPurpose: Design or
Performance?, 61 S. CAL.L. REv. 237 (1987).
20. The corresponding Florida statutory section isFLA. STAT. § 672.314 (1995).
21. At a minimum, to be merchantable goods must:

(a)pass without objection inthe trade under the contract description; and
average quality within the description;
(b)inthe case of fungible goods, are of fair
and
for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used; and
(c)are fit
(d)run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality and
units involved; and
quantity within each unit and among all
(e)are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require;
and
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meant to be exhausted by these elements."2 Thus, according to comment
6, goods that meet all the elements listed in 2-314(2) might still not be
merchantable. There are, however, two basic legal requirements which
must be fulfilled in order for the warranty of merchantability to be
implied. First, the seller must be a merchant with respect to the particular goods. 23 Second, the goods must be "fit for the ordinary purposes for
which such goods are used."24 There is usually little debate over
whether the first requirement is met, but significant litigation has
25
occurred in reference to the second requirement.
There are policy reasons for implying such warranties which in
effect hold the seller liable for any defects.26 The seller has a greater
incentive to assure the production of a quality product that will meet the
intended purpose. The seller is also in a stronger economic position to
spread the cost of nonperformance because it can simply adjust the price
of his product. In addition, buyers usually have commercially reasonable expectations, and sellers should bear the risk of nonconformance
with such reasonable expectations.
This sampling of the implied warranties provided for by the UCC
does not, of course, apply to the sale of real property which is what this
Note addresses.27 It is helpful, however, to understand these warranties
in relation to the UCC to better appreciate the warranties the Florida
Legislature has adopted in regards to condominium sales. It is also
important to note that for a period of time in Florida, like in many other
states, a buyer of a small personal good would be protected against a
defect under the UCC while a home purchaser was awarded no such
protection. This dilemma was eloquently described by an Arkansas
court:
One who bought a chattel as simple as a walking stick or a kitchen
mop was entitled to get his money back if the article was not of merchantable quality. But the purchaser of a $50,000 home ordinarily
had no remedy even if the foundation proved to be so defective that
(f)conform to the promise or affirmations of fact made on the container or label if
any.
U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(a)-(f) (1994).
22. "Subsection (2) does not purport to exhaust the meaning of 'merchantable' nor to negate
any of its attributes not specifically mentioned in the text of the statute, but arising by usage of
trade or through case law." U.C.C. § 2-314, cmt. 6 (1994).
23. See id. § 2-314(1).
24. Id. § 2-314(2)(c).

25. "There are... perhaps tens of thousands, of cases in which the plaintiff's lawyer has had
to convince the jury or a judge that the goods... were not merchantable .. " JAMES J. WUTE &
ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-8, at 352 (4th ed. 1995).
26. See Gonzales, supra note 19, at 245-47. For a definition of "goods" see U.C.C. 2-105(1)
(1994).

27. See U.C.C. § 2-102 (1994) (stating that "this Article applies to transactions in goods").
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the structure collapsed into a heap of rubble.2 8

This contradiction encouraged courts to adopt some of the same
protections that the UCC provides for the sale of goods to transactions
involving real property.
Florida's landmark decision that departed from the doctrine of
caveat emptor with regard to residential construction was Gable v. Silver.29 In Gable, the plaintiff condominium apartment owners were dissatisfied with their air-conditioning systems and attempted to obtain
relief from the defendant who was both the builder and developer. The
opinion of the Fourth District Court of Appeal, which was later adopted
by the Florida Supreme Court, 30 began its analysis by first showing that
the one year express warranty on the air-conditioning system was not
applicable and then deciding that the air-conditioning system was, in
fact, realty. 3 1 After disposing of these two points, the court addressed
the "general and still the majority rule ...that implied warranties do not
apply to realty." 32 The court quoted favorably the decisions of other
states that adopted an implied warranty to realty.33 A reference was
made to the states not adopting this modem view, 34 and the court also
restated that the UCC was not applicable because the seller was not a
merchant dealing in goods.3 5 The court based its final decision "upon
present day trends, logic, and practical justice in realty dealings. 3 6 The
court held and "flatly declare[d] that the implied warranties of fitness
and merchantabilty extend to the purchase of new condominiums in
Florida from builders. ' 37 The court then certified the question to the
Florida Supreme Court which adopted the lower court's answer.38
The facts of Gable limited its immediate application to builder-sellers and to first purchasers of condominium homes. The court acknowledged that it "ponder[ed], but [did] not decide, what result would occur
if more remote purchasers were involved. ' 39 The court also realized that
the facts of the case limited its decision to "the sale of new homes or
condominiums." 40
28. Wawak v. Stewart, 449 S.W.2d 922, 923 (Ark. 1970).
29. 258 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972), cert. discharged, 264 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1972).

30. See Gable v. Silver, 264 So. 2d 418, 419 (Fla. 1972).
31. See Gable, 258 So. 2d at 13-14.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 14.
See id. at 14-16.
See id. at 16-17.
See id. at 17-18.
Id. at 18.
Id.
See Gable v. Silver, 264 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1972).
Gable, 258 So. 2d at 18.
Id.
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In Gable, Florida adopted the modem view and departed from the
doctrine of caveat emptor with regard to certain classes of residential
construction. With the state legislature's subsequent codification of an
implied warranty of fitness and merchantibility for condominiums,41
Florida departed from the majority of states that were relying on a case
by case decisional approach. 2 It is this codification and the Florida
Supreme Court's decision in Leisure Resorts, Inc. v. Frank J. Rooney,

Inc. which provide the basis of this Note.
B.

Purpose of the Statute

Section 718.203 is part of a much larger statutory scheme adopted
in Florida dealing with condominiums. An entire chapter in the Florida
statutes is dedicated to condominium law.4 3 Condominium law issues
have been highly litigated over the past fifteen years and an entire new
branch of law dealing with condominium law issues has developed." In
the 1995 edition of the Martindale-Hubbel Law Directory, 220 Florida
law firms indicate that they consider condominium law one of their specialties.45 There is an intricate system in place for dealing with a broad
range of condominium disputes. These disputes include the issue of
restraints on alienation,46 the issue of a developer failing to fulfill the
promises of a glossy brochure, 47 and the issue of a contractor's liability
for faulty construction.48
Generally, the purpose of the entire structure of condominium law
is to provide protection to buyers, and certainty to buyers, sellers, developers, and contractors. 4 9 This certainty allows the parties involved to
41. See FLA. STAT. § 718.203 (1995).
42. See Somerstein, supra note 13, at 579.
43. FLA. STAT. § 718 (1995).
44. See Robert J. Manne, Condominium Construction Litigation: Resolving Those Building
Disputes Between Unit Owners and Developers, 54 FLA. B. J. 762, 762 (1980).
45. This information was attained via a computer search on Lexis focusing on Florida firms
listing "condominium law" as a practice area. The search parameters were: State(Florida) and
practice(Condominium) and not law school (J.D. or L.L.B).

46. See, e.g., Camino Gardens Ass'n v. McKim, 612 So. 2d 636, 640 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)
(holding that a provision prohibiting the conveyance of property to anyone other than an
association member is void as a restraint on alienation).
47. See, e.g., Callihan v. Turtle Kraals, Ltd., 523 So. 2d 800, 800-01 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)

(holding that developers were liable for failure to complete the amenities stressed in the sales
brochure).
48. See, e.g., Rogers & Ford Constr. Corp. v. Carlandia Corp., 626 So. 2d 1350, 1351 (Fla.
1993) (holding that an individual condominium unit owner has standing to sue a general
contractor to recover damages for construction defects in the common area); see also Somerstein,
supra note 13, at 579.

49. See e.g., FLA. STAT. § 718.203(l)-(2) (1995) (providing for implied warranties of fitness
and merchantability for the purchaser by the developer and for the developer and purchaser by the
contractor and all subcontractors).
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better foresee potential problems and to allocate funds to prevent, mitigate, or compensate for these problems. The law also allows the parties
to allocate the risks involved in building and creating a condominium
project. Although this could be done on a case by case basis following
case law, codification, as Florida has done, is more efficient.
The specific purpose of section 718.203 is to protect the purchaser
of each unit as well as the developer of the project.50 The section is
divided into seven subsections but the applicable substantive portion is
in subsections one and two. In order to give an adequate overview of
the statute, a brief description of the important subsections follows.
Subsections one and two will then be more thoroughly discussed by
focusing specifically on the differences between warranties provided by
a developer and those provided by a contractor, subcontractor or
supplier.
Subsection one focuses on the implied warranty of fitness and
merchantibility for the purposes or uses intended and is deemed to be
granted to the purchaser of each unit by the developer. 5' It is important
to note that this is the developer's warranty section and is applicable to
individual unit buyers. Subparts (a) through (f) of subsection one
describe this implied warranty. Subpart (a) limits it to three years "commencing with the completion of the building containing the unit. '52 Part
(b) specifies that "personal property that is transferred with, or appurtenant to, each unit, [has] a warranty which is for the same period of time
as that provided for by the manufacturer of the personal property. 53
This warranty commences at the time of the sale's closing or on the date
of the unit's possession, whichever is earlier. 4 Part (c) sets out a three
year warranty, for all other improvements, beginning with the date of
completion of the improvements. 5 5 Part (d) applies to all other personal
property for the use of unit owners and provides for a warranty which
must be the same as that provided by the manufacturer of the personal
property.56
Subpart (e) is the longest of the subparts and applies to the roof,
structural components or other improvements, and to mechanical, electrical and plumbing elements serving improvements or a building.57
These specified items have a warranty good for three years beginning
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

This section is entitled "Warranties."
See FLA. STAT. § 718.203(1) (1995).
Id. § 718.203(1)(a).
Id. § 718.203(1)(b).
See id.
See id. § 718.203(l)(c).
See id. § 718.203(l)(d).
See id. § 728.203(l)(e).
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with the completion of the building or improvement or one year after
owners, other than the developer, take control of the association, whichever occurs last.58 In no event, however, will this warranty exceed five

years.5 9 This subpart also has an important exception since "mechanical
elements serving only one unit" are not included.6 °
The last subpart of subsection one, subpart (f), covers all other
property which is conveyed with a unit and supplies an initial purchaser
of each unit a one year
warranty from the date of closing or possession,
61
whichever is earlier.

Subsection two of Florida Statute section 718.203 involves the
implied warranties of fitness as to work performed or materials supplied
by a contractor, subcontractor or supplier to the developer and to the
purchaser of each unit. 62 This subsection specifically applies to contrac-

tors, subcontractors and suppliers and thus can be referred to as the contractor's warranty section. Subpart (a) provides a warranty to the roof
and structural components of the building or improvement and mechanical and plumbing elements serving a building or an improvement, for a
period of three years from the date of completion of the building or
improvement. 63 Once again, there is the exception that this warranty
excludes "mechanical units serving only one unit." 6 Subpart (b) pro65
vides a one year warranty as to all other improvements and materials.
The remaining subsections, (3) through (7), focus on more general
aspects of warranties. These subsections are not pertinent to the issues
addressed by the court in Leisure Resorts.66
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. See id. § 718.203(l)(f).
62. See id. § 718.203(2).
63. See id. § 718.203(2)(a).
64. Id.
65. See id. § 718.203(2)(b).
66. Although not pertinent to the case at hand, subsections (3) to (7) are cited in full here to
give an accurate overview of the section:
(3) "Completion of a building or improvement" means issuance of a certificate
of occupancy for the entire building or improvement, or the equivalent authorization
issued by the governmental body having jurisdiction, and in jurisdictions where no
certificate of occupancy or equivalent authorization is issued, it means substantial
completion of construction, finishing, and equipping of the building or improvement
according to the plans and specifications.
(4) These warranties are conditioned upon routine maintenance being
performed, unless the maintenance is an obligation of the developer or a developercontrolled association.
(5) The warranties provided by this section shall inure to the benefit of each
owner and his successor owners and to the benefit of the developer.
(6) Nothing in this section affects a condominium as to which rights are
established by contracts for sale of 10 percent or more of the units in the
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As noted earlier, the purpose of section 718.203 is to provide a
codification of the case law finding implied warranties in real property.
An implied warranty arises by operation of law and exists regardless of
any intention of the vendor to create it. 67 Such a statutory warranty was

first provided for by the enactment to the 1974 Supplement to the Condominium Act. Florida was a trailblazer in this area primarily because
the condominium boom began in Florida. 68 The extension of implied
warranties to a condominium may have occurred for reasons very similar to those quoted by the Gable court. That court quoted Williston on
Contracts and stated: "It would be much better if this enlightened
approach [applying an implied warranty to realty] were generally
adopted with respect to the sale of new houses for it would tend to discourage much of the sloppy work and jerry-building that has become
perceptible over the years."169 This is an extraordinarily persuasive policy reason for adopting the rule that the Florida Supreme Court adopted
and the Florida Legislature later enacted.
C.

Differentiating Contractorand Developer Warranties

Although the Florida Supreme Court in Leisure Resorts, Inc. v.
Frank J. Rooney, Inc. reversed and remanded the district court's decision, it did agree with the district court's conclusion that the contractor's
warranties differ in scope from the developer's warranties.70 This distinction can be viewed concretely by focusing on a chart the district
court included in its opinion with a footnote that it had "taken literary
license of borrowing this helpful format from the brief submitted by the
Amicus Curiae," The Associated General Contractors of America.71
condominium by the developer to prospective unit owners prior to July 1, 1974, or
as to condominium buildings on which construction has been commenced prior to
July 1, 1974.
(7) Residential condominiums may be covered by an insured warranty
program underwritten by a licensed insurance company registered in this state,
provided that such warranty program meets the minimum requirements of this
chapter; to the degree that such warranty program does not meet the minimum
requirements of this chapter, such requirements shall apply.
Id. § 718.203(3)-(7).
67. See BICK's LAw DICTIONARY 1587 (6th ed. 1990).
68. See Manne, supra note 44, at 766.
69. Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11, 15 (Fla.4th DCA 1972) (quoting 7 SAMUEL WILISTON &
WALTER H.E. JUEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 926, at 818 (3d ed. 1963)).
70. Leisure Resorts, 654 So. 2d at 914.
71. Frank J. Rooney, Inc. v. Leisure Resorts, Inc., 624 So. 2d 773, 776 n.2 (Fla. 4th DCA
1993); see also Amicus Curiae Brief of the Associated General Contractors of America, at 5-6,
Leisure Resorts, Inc. v. Frank J. Rooney, Inc., 654 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1995) (No. 82578). The
emphasis in the chart was in the original district court's opinion.
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This chart describes the warranties provided for in Section 718.203 by
taking the actual language and separating it into a clear format.
THE DEVELOPER'S WARRANTY
(1) The developer shall be deemed
to have granted to the purchaser of
each unit an implied warranty of
fitness and merchantabilityfor the
purposes or uses intended as
follows:
(a) As to each unit, a warranty for
3 years commencing with the
completion of the building
containing the unit.
(b) As to the personal property that
is transferred with, or appurtenant
to, each unit, a warranty which is
for the same period as that provided
by the manufacturer of the personal
property, commencing with the date
of closing of the purchase or the
date of possession of the unit,
whichever is earlier.
(c) As to all other improvements
for the use of the unit owners, a 3year warranty commencing with the
date of completion of the
improvements.
(d) As to all other personal
propertyfor the use of unit owners,
a warranty which shall be the same
as that provided by the
manufacturer of the personal
property.

THE CONTRACTOR'S WARRANTY
(2) The contractor,and all
subcontractors and suppliers, grant
to the developer and to the
purchaser of each unit implied
warranties of fitness as to the work
performed or materials supplied by
them as follows:

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

(e) As to the roof and structural
components of a building or other
improvements and as to mechanical,
electrical, and plumbing elements
serving improvements or a building,
except mechanical elements serving
only one unit, a warranty for a
period beginning with the
completion of construction of each
building or improvement and
continuing for 3 years thereafter or
1 year after owners other than the
developer obtain control of the
association, whichever occurs last,
but in no event more than 5 years.
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(a) For a period of 3 years from the
date of completion of construction
of a building or improvement, a
warranty as to the roof and
structural components of the
building or improvement and
mechanical and plumbing elements
serving a building or an
improvement, except mechanical
elements serving only one unit
(b) For a period of 1 year after
completion of all construction, a
warranty as to all other
improvements and materials.

(f) As to all other property which is
conveyed with a unit, a warranty to
the initial purchaser of each unit for
a period of 1 year from the date of
closing of the purchase or the date
of possession, whichever occurs
first.
The statute delineates the distinction between the implied warranties applicable to developers and the implied warranties applicable to
contractors. The developer's warranty is a "warranty of fitness and
merchantibility for the purposes or uses intended."7 2 In contrast, the

contractor's warranty is a "warrant[y] of fitness as to the work performed or materialssupplied."7 3 Since the legislature used a term in one

section of the statute but omitted it in another, the court will not imply it
where it has been excluded. 74 Thus, these two warranties are different,
and the Florida Supreme Court acknowledged this difference.
The policy reason for such a difference lies in the fact that
"intended use or purpose" is more a matter within the control and scope
of the developer through its architect and engineer. 75 These are the people who have control of the design of the building. The contractor, on
the other hand, has control over the competency of the work performed
and quality of the materials supplied in constructing condominium
buildings based on the plans and specifications. 76 Thus, both the Fourth
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

FLA. STAT. § 718.203(1) (1995) (emphasis added).
Id. § 718.203(2) (emphasis added).
See Leisure Resorts, 654 So. 2d at 914.
See id.
See id.

1996]CHANGING CONDOMINIUM CONSTRUCTION LAW IN FLORIDA 181

District Court of Appeal and the Florida Supreme Court agreed that the
trial court's jury instructions were incorrect." The trial court instructed
the jury that a defect could be found, and the contractor's warranty was
thereby violated, if the equipment was not reasonably fit for the specific
purpose for which it was supplied.7" The jury thus could have found for
the developer if the air-conditioning equipment was not reasonably fit
for cooling the individual units which would have gone beyond the warranty a contractor has. The trial court's instruction "had the effect of
including in the contractor's warranty the design of the condominium
buildings."79 This effect is not one intended by the statute, nor one supported by policy reasons. As noted earlier, the developer, with its engineers and architects, has the design and intended use or purpose more
within its control.
In fact, in Leisure Resorts, the developer did have its own engineer
and architect who specified a certain brand of air-conditioning units.
The originally specified manufacturer, Carrier, declined the job and
General Electric, another manufacturer deemed acceptable, would not
guarantee its units without modification to the plans."0 The developer
declined to incorporate the modifications.8 1 The developer's architect
and engineer did approve the use of Frigiking Tappan units which were
the units ultimately installed." These facts further show that the developer retains control over design of a building and over the specified
items that will be used in the construction of a building.
Since it is established that a contractor does not warrant items for a
"specific purpose," what exactly does a contractor warrant? What
exactly is the contractor's warranty of fitness?
III.

THE CONTRACTOR'S WARRANTY OF FITNESS

A.

Generally

As described earlier, the contractor has an implied warranty
imposed upon him under Florida Statute section 718.203(2). This
implied warranty is a warranty of fitness as to the work performed or
materials supplied. 3 The Florida Supreme Court in Leisure Resorts
77. See id.; Frank J. Rooney, Inc. v. Leisure Resorts, Inc., 624 So. 2d 773, 776 (Fla. 4th DCA
1993).
78. See Frank J.Rooney, 624 So. 2d at 776; see also Respondent's Answer Brief on the
Merits at A.10, Leisure Resorts, Inc. v. Frank J. Rooney, Inc., 654 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1995) (No.
82578).
79. Leisure Resorts, 654 So. 2d. at 914.
80. See id. at 912.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See FLA. STAT. § 718.203(2) (1995).
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stated that in order to be in compliance with this warranty, a contractor
"must provide work and materials which conform with the generally
accepted standards of workmanship and performance of similar work
and materials meeting the requirements specified in the contract. '8 4 The
court then cited
David v. B & J Holding Corp.15 to support this
86
proposition.
The facts of David, however, do not help clarify a contractor's warranty or how it can be met. In David, the plaintiff, a buyer of a condominium unit, sued the developer-builder because he did not include
proper sound proofing and insulation in the party walls.8 7 The developer-builder failed to construct the walls as specified in the building
plans recorded with and approved by the municipal building and zoning
department.88 There are two factual distinctions between David and Leisure Resorts which make it difficult to apply the court's reasoning in one
to the other.
First, in David, the builder and developer were the same entity.8 9
This makes it difficult to apply the warranty distinctions that are made
for a developer and a contractor. When the developer is also the contractor, the two types of statutory implied warranties, for "intended use
or purpose", and for the work performed or materials supplied, are easily
blended. An entity that is simultaneously the developer and the contractor or builder is responsible for both types of implied warranties. In
contrast, in Leisure Resorts, Frank J. Rooney was only the contractor. It
did not warrant items for "intended purpose or use" as a developer
would.
Secondly, in David, the facts indicate that the developer-builder did
not construct the building per the plans and specifications. 90 Even with
the slight discrepancies in factual accounts that Leisure Resorts, the
developer, and Frank J. Rooney, the contractor, presented, there is no
indication that Rooney did not construct the building according to the
plans and specifications. The change that was necessary to make in reference to the air-conditioning manufacturer was made in writing and
signed by Leisure Resorts, its architect, and Frank J. Rooney. 9' In submitting the data of the new air-conditioning manufacturer, Frigiking
84. Leisure Resorts, 654 So. 2d at 914.
85. 349 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).

86. See Leisure Resorts, 654 So. 2d at 914.
87. David, 349 So. 2d at 677.

88. See id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See Respondent's Answer Brief on the Merits at 6, Leisure Resorts, Inc. v. Frank J.
Rooney, Inc., 654 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1995) (No. 82578); Frank J.Rooney, Inc. v. Leisure Resorts,
Inc., 624 So. 2d 773, 774 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).
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Tappan, Rooney did not certify that the Tappan units complied with the
original contract, but the architect and engineer nonetheless specifically
approved the Tappan units. The change order signed by the parties specifically directed Rooney to install the Tappan units. Therefore, Frank J.
Rooney followed the plans and specifications that were set out by the
developer, its engineer and its architect.
Thus, the facts and holding of David do not, in actuality, shed much
light on the definition of the contractor's implied warranty in general. It
is well established that a contractor is responsible for complying with
the plans and specifications furnished by the owner.92 But that is not the
issue here. As a contractor, according to statute, Rooney only has a
warranty of fitness as to the work performed or materials supplied.93
This warranty has nothing to do with the "purpose or use intended." 94
B.

Warranty of Fitness and Its Application to "Materials" Including
Manufactured Items

Because both the Florida Supreme Court and the Florida Legislature have established that a contractor does not warrant for the "purpose
and use intended," it is necessary to see how the contractor's warranty of
fitness as to the work performed or materials supplied is applied. The
focus of the application will be on pre-manufactured items such as the
air-conditioning condenser units at issue in Leisure Resorts.
Under section 718.203(2), the contractor's warranty covers "materials supplied ...[flor a period of 3 years.

.

." and "all other improve-

ments and materials" for a period of one year after completion of all
construction.95 Nowhere in subsection (2), the contractor portion of the
statute, is there a reference to manufactured items or even a manufacturer. Manufacturer, however, does show up twice in the developer's
portion of the statute.96 Subsection (1)(b) of section 718.203 requires
the developer to provides a warranty for all "personal property that is
transferred with, or appurtenant to, each unit" for a period that is the
92. See, e.g., United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132, 136 (1918) (holding that contractor who
is bound to build according to plans will not be responsible for the consequences of defects in the
plans); Charles R. Perry Constr., Inc. v. C. Barry Gibson and Assoc., 523 So. 2d 1221, 1223 (Fla.
1st DCA 1988) (holding that a contractor's responsibility is only to install the approved system in
accordance with manufacturer's instructions); Atlantic Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville v. Modular

Age, Inc., 363 So. 2d 1152, 1155 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (holding that it is an architect's
responsibility to design walls that meet fire code requirements and contractor is not liable for any
insufficiency).
93. See FLA. STAT. § 718.203(2) (1995).
94. See id. § 718.203(1).
95. Id. § 718.203(2)(a)-(b).
96. Id. § 718.203(1)(b), (d).
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same as the warranty provided by the manufacturer.97 Section (1)(d)
provides "[a]s to all other personal property... a warranty which shall
be the same as that provided by the manufacturerof the personal property.""8 If a manufactured item, the condenser in this case, is to fall

under the contractor's warranty, it can only do so by meeting the definition of "materials" in section 718.203(2)(b).
Although it may be possible to consider a manufactured item a
"material," there are several reasons not to do so. The manufactured
item has an express manufacturer's warranty of its own. That warranty
is provided to the contractor when he purchases the unit for construction
and the contractor turns that warranty over to the developer at construction completion. The developer, in turn, provides the warranty to the
purchasers of the individual units.99 This process explains why the
developer must warrant all personal property in the unit for the same
period of time as the manufacturer warranty under Section 718.203
(1)(b) and (1)(d). Therefore, it does not seem necessary to include manufactured items under the definition of "materials" in the contractor's
portion of the statute. Yet, this is exactly what the Florida Supreme
Court did in Leisure Resorts.

°°

The Florida Supreme Court concluded "that manufactured items
constitute 'materials' as that term is used in section 718.203(2)."1 1

Manufactured items are now therefore covered by the contractor's statutory warranty of fitness.
IV.

ANALYSIS OF

Leisure Resorts, Inc. v. Frank J. Rooney, Inc.

A.

Extension of "Materials"

The Florida Supreme Court' 02 begins its decision in Leisure
Resorts by answering the certified question presented to them from the
Fourth District Court of Appeal by "holding that a contractor's statutory
warranty of fitness does apply to manufactured items such as air-conditioning units supplied by the contractor for use in a building project but
that the contractor does not warrant those items for a 'specific purpose'
under the provisions of section 718.203(2)."103 The court then gives a
recapitulation of the facts of the case similar to the ones discussed earlier
97. Id. § 718.203(l)(b).
98. Id. § 718.203(l)(d) (emphasis added).
99. See Respondent's Answer Brief on the Merits at 24-25, Leisure Resorts, Inc. v. Frank J.
Rooney, Inc., 654 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1995) (No. 82578).
100. 654 So. 2d at 914.
101. Id.
102. Justice Wells wrote the opinion in Leisure Resorts and all justices concurred except
Justice Anstead, who was recused.

103. 654 So. 2d at 912.
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in this Note. From there, the first issue addressed deals with the Fourth
District Court of Appeal's conclusion that manufactured items for which
there was a manufacturer's warranty do not fall within the "materials"
language as used in section 718.203.
The Florida Supreme Court disapproves of the Fourth District
Court of Appeal's decision on this point, interpreting section 718.203 in
a "plain and obvious" way.'04 The court simply concludes that manufactured items constitute "materials" and cites two cases in support of its
statutory interpretation.
The first case cited involved a certified question to the Florida
Supreme Court attempting to ascertain the correct interpretation of a discovery privilege set out in a Florida statute. 105 In Holly v. Auld, the
court stated that a "statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning"
when the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous. 0 6 But the
Holly court also acknowledged that a departure from the letter of the
statute is appropriate if there are cogent reasons for believing that 1the
07
letter of the law does not accurately represent the legislative intent.
In Leisure Resorts, one can strongly argue that the legislative
intent, determined by focusing on the statute in its entirety, especially
the distinction between contractor and developer warranties, was not to
define materials in a way that includes manufactured items. An especially strong argument could be made because the term "manufacturer"
is used in section (1) of the statute. Surely, the legislature could have
also used "manufacturer" in section (2) had it so intended.
The court also cites United Bonding Insurance Co. v. Tuggle,10 8 to
support the proposition of "plain and obvious" meaning. This case
involved the construction of a Florida statute dealing with contracts to
indemnify sureties. 09 In United Bonding, the court stated that "the legislature must be assumed to have intended the plain meaning of its
words."1 10 Yet, even the court in United Bonding acknowledged that the
purpose of the statute can be looked at when doubt exists."' In fact, the
court stated that "[t]he intent of the legislature is the touchstone."" 2 In
Leisure Resorts, doubt exists because of the statute's wording. There104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 914.
See Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 218 (Fla. 1984).
Id. at 719 (quoting A.R. Douglas, Inc. v. McRainey, 137 So. 157, 159 (Fla. 1931).
See id.
216 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968).
See id. at 81.
Id.
See id. at 82.

112. Id.
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fore, the Florida Supreme Court should have looked further than the
plain and obvious meaning of a single word.
B.

Contractor Warranty vs. Developer Warranty

After the cursory disposal of the "materials" issue, the court moves
to the differing scopes of the contractor's and developer's warranties.
The Florida Supreme Court approves the Fourth District Court of
Appeal's conclusion that the warranties differed in scope."l 3 They reach
this decision by focusing on both case law and policy reasons. The first
case cited dealt with the interpretation of a statute to determine if it was
self-executing." 4 In FloridaState Racing Commission v. Bourquardez,
the court stated that "[t]he legislature is presumed to know the meaning
of words and the rules of grammar."' " 5 The Florida Supreme Court in
Leisure Resorts thus concludes that when the legislature uses one term
in part of a statute but does not use it in another, the court will not imply
it where it is excluded.1" 6 This reasoning is sensible and the result
reached is reasonable. But one must wonder why the court did not use
this same reasoning when dealing with the terms "materials" and
"manufacturer."
The second case cited interpreted the word "affinity" under the
Florida Crimes Compensation Act."' In Ocasio v. Bureau of Crimes
Compensation Division of Workers' Compensation, the court discussed

the use of technical words but also focused on the principle that the
deliberate use of another word is strong evidence that different meanings
were intended." 8 The Leisure Resorts court uses this principle to
strengthen its result of acknowledging the different warranty classifications for contractor and developer. Once again, one must question why
the court does not adopt this same principle when defining "materials."
The court's policy reason for adopting the differences in the scopes
of the warranties is stated quite directly. The developer has control over
the design of the building while the building contractor does not." 9
Thus, the contractor should not be held liable for a design that is beyond
its control.
The court then briefly states the contractor's requirements to satisfy
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
2d 751,
118.
119.

See Leisure Resorts, Inc. v. Frank J. Rooney, Inc., 654 So. 2d 911, 914 (Fla. 1995).
See Florida State Racing Comm'n v. Bourquardez, 42 So. 2d 87, 88 (Fla. 1949).
Id.
654 So. 2d at 914.
See Ocasio v. Bureau of Crimes Compensation Div. of Workers' Compensation, 408 So.
752 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
See id. at 752-53.
See Leisure Resorts, 654 So. 2d at 914.
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his implied warranty.' 2° This single sentence is of little help especially
since the one supporting case the court cites, David v. B & J Holding
Corp., 2 ' is factually different. Both this case and the court's sentence
were discussed in Section II C of this Note.
C.

The Court's Final Decision

The court concludes by acknowledging several points and remanding one issue. First, the court held that the trial court erred in its jury
instruction since the instruction "had the effect of including in the contractor's warranty the design of the condominium buildings."1 22 This
effect went beyond the scope of the contractor's warranty by including
within it the developer's warranty.
Next, the court holds that the Fourth District Court of Appeal's
decision granting a directed verdict for the contractor with regard to the
contractor's statutory warranty was inappropriate. There was evidence
upon which a jury could find that the equipment was defective. This
evidence, in the form of the engineer's testimony regarding a study of
the malfunctioning air-conditioning units, created a jury issue and, thus,
a directed verdict should not have been granted.123
The Florida Supreme Court quashed the district court's decision to
the extent it was inconsistent with its own and remanded to the Fourth
District Court of Appeal so that it may look at the remaining issues. 2 4
If these issues did not prove dispositive, the Fourth District must remand
for a new trial at which time the jury, after being properly instructed in
accord with the Florida Supreme Court's opinion, would decide
"whether the air-conditioning units conformed with generally accepted
units complying with the
standards of performance of air-conditioning
' 25
specifications of the contract."'
The Fourth District Court of Appeal subsequently considered the
1 26
issues in accordance with this decision and remanded for a new trial.
V.

A.

COMMENT

New Problems Raised

The Leisure Resorts opinion by the Florida Supreme Court has a
120. See id.
121. 349 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
122. Leisure Resorts, 654 So. 2d at 914.
123. See id.

124. See id. at 914.
125. Id. at 914.
126. See Frank J. Rooney, Inc. v. Leisure Resorts, Inc. 666 So. 2d 1053, 1053 (Fla. 4th DCA
1996).
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negative effect on contractors. The extent of that negative effect is not
yet known, but it is possible to hypothesize about what problems and
potential concerns lie ahead.
Rooney, the contractor, thought it was doing everything correctly.
The air-conditioning units are "mechanical elements serving only one
unit" which clearly takes them outside of section 718.203(2)(a). When
the manufacturer of the originally specified units would not guarantee
the units, Rooney arranged for another manufacturer, Tappan, to deal
directly with the developer, architect, and engineer. Tappan furnished a
written warranty directly to the architect that guaranteed its units.1 27 A
written change order was executed listing the Tappan units that would
be used. The Tappan units were accompanied by a manufacturer's warranty which was delivered by Rooney to Leisure Resorts at the conclusion of the construction.1 28 This manufacturer warranty was or should
have been delivered to the individual unit purchasers. Rooney followed
all the steps that a prudent contractor would follow. Yet, Rooney is still
in a position of liability for the air-conditioning units. Although the contractor could always recover from the manufacturer, where the manufacturer has gone out of business, as in this case, 29 the contractor is left
holding the bag. It should not be placed in that position to begin with.
This decision opens up the following questions: Where will the
line be drawn? Does every manufactured item that is supplied by the
contractor now fit the definition of "materials"? A refrigerator? A
microwave? A heater? What is the purpose of requiring a developer to
warrant the personal property that is transferred with or appurtenant30 to
each unit for the same period of time as the manufacturer warranty if
that property is a "material" and thus protected under the contractor's
warranty?
The inability to answer these questions points to the conclusion that
the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Leisure Resorts was wrong.
The decision seems to take responsibility off the developer's shoulders
and burdens the contractor who is only following the developer's specifications and providing the developer with all the manufacturer's warranties. The developer, through its architect and engineer, may often
choose equipment from a specific manufacturer because of past use,
familiarity, price, or even because of the warranty that the manufacturer
provides. If a contractor follows these specifications which it has a min127. See Respondent's Answer Brief on the Merits at A.6, Leisure Resorts, Inc. v. Frank J.
Rooney, Inc., 654 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1995) (No. 82578).

128. See id. at 24.
129. See Letter from James E. Glass, attorney for contractor, James E. Glass & Associates,
(Jan. 30, 1996) (on file with author).
130. This is required under FLA. STAT. § 718.203(1) (1995).
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imal, if any, say about, it should not be responsible for faulty equipment.
The manufacturer has warrantied this equipment and the developer
should seek recovery from the manufacturer. If that is not possible, the
developer should be the one that has assumed the risk because it has
selected the manufacturer by specifying the equipment to be used. After
Leisure Resorts, however, this is not the law in Florida. In Florida, a
contractor's implied warranty now covers manufactured goods. This
extension has an effect of making the contractor guarantee manufactured
goods that he did not select, could not select, and perhaps even objected
to. This is not a fair result, and it is not good business.
B. Avoiding the Effect of the Decision
As a condominium contractor in Florida, it is going to be difficult,
if not impossible, to avoid the far reaching effects of the Leisure Resorts
decision. Simply said, if the manufactured item used is defective, the
contractor's implied warranty covers it. If the manufacturer has since
gone out of business, the contractor will not be able to recover from the
manufacturer and thus must pay for the damages. The most obvious
way to avoid such a result is to take the position that the manufactured
item is not defective at all, but instead the item does not work as anticipated because of faulty design.
The faulty design argument may put the "defect", or problem, back
within the scope of the developer's warranty since the developer's warranty is one of fitness and merchantability for the "purposes or uses
intended." When Leisure Resorts goes back for a new trial, Rooney
could attempt to use the argument that the air-conditioning units are not
defective at all. The units conform with the generally accepted standards of performance of similar materials meeting the requirements
specified in the contract. The units are simply not cooling appropriately
because the "stacked design", created by those within the control of the
developer, would make it impossible for any unit to work appropriately.
The problem is not the air-conditioning unit-the problem is the faulty
design. Of course, this argument would be strengthened if Rooney
brought in an engineer to counter the developer's engineer who made
the study of the malfunctioning units.
In Leisure Resorts, the contractor may have one additional way to
avoid liability. The contractor could require the developer to show that
all of the 122 air-conditioning units in the building are defective. If they
are not cooling properly, yet they are not all defective, then the design of
the building could certainly be the problem.131
131. This was an idea generated by the contractor's attorney, James E. Glass. He indicated
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CONCLUSION

The Leisure Resorts case clarified two points of Florida Statute section 718.203. First, the Florida Supreme Court held that a developer's
and contractor's implied statutory warranties are different in scope. The
developer's warranty covers the fitness and merchantability for the "purposes or uses intended" while the contractor's warranty was one of fitness as to the work performed or materials supplied. Secondly, the court
found that manufactured items were "materials" under the statute and
thus were covered under the contractor's warranty. The effects of this
decision may not be known for some time, but it is clear that a contractor's implied statutory warranty has been extended significantly.
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